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Abstract 
When a company is hacked, market participants take notice.  This has been observed consistently for at least a decade, mostly through 
calculating abnormal returns of individual corporate stocks after a company’s information security incident announcement.  Some 
researchers have found that information security incidents have had a decreasing effect on stock price over time.  Their reports suggest 
that breach related stock price impacts have become increasingly shallow and short-lived.  This has led some information security 
economists to suggest that market forces are not enough to incentivize sufficient corporate investment to information security.  They 
argue that further regulation is necessary to remedy what seems like a rise in investor apathy toward corporate breaches.  Other 
researchers, though, have cautioned that further examination is required and that other market metrics—beyond individual stock price 
movements—are available to better understand the effects of an information security incident. 
 
Sector-wide systematic risk is a measure of the sector’s exposure to exogenous shock.  Here, this risk measurement is applied to 
measure the spillover effects of a corporate information security incident.  I conduct 203 event studies between the years 2006 and 
2016, calculating sector-wide systematic risk within American stock markets, to measure the spillover effects of data breaches within 
finance, healthcare, technology and services sectors.  The novel application of a longitudinal analysis of variance between repeated 
event studies reveals that the sector-wide spillover of an incident is both significant and growing.  This suggests that an increasingly 
compelling market incentive exists for sectors to police themselves.  Also, further inquiry into common factors among outliers to these 
sector-wide trends may reveal best-practice strategies for information security risk management. 
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1 Introduction  
Increasing rates of data breaches, despite ongoing information security 
investments, motivate continued research in information security 
economics (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyschyn, & Zhou, 2015). Attacks span 
industries (consumer electronics, retail, etc.) and market categories 
(government, public, private, not-for-profit) (Hinz, Nofer, Schiereck, & 
Trillig, 2015). To better inform information security investment, there 
have been several analytic attempts to quantify and understand the effects 
of information security incidents. 
 
Anderson (2001) provided seminal research investigating the difficulties 
of quantifying the inputs to information security investment decisions 
through the lens of economics. Estimating changes to the market-
generated risk premium, represented by the beta coefficient in modern 
portfolio theory’s capital asset pricing model, as shown in Equation 1, 
where  represents the intercept of the regression,  represents the slope 
of the regression measuring systematic risk, Rm represents the expected 
market return, Rf represents the risk-free rate, and  represents the random 
error accounting for unsystematic risk (Cardenas, Coronado, Donald, 
Parra & Mahmood, 2012).   
 







This model is a necessary component of a manager’s decision calculus 
regarding capital allocations (Anderson, 2001). Managers of publicly 
traded firms seek to positively impact share prices and are thereby 
influenced by changes to the risk premiums applied within capital 
markets.  Anderson’s 2001 investigation of difficulties with quantifying 
the inputs to information security investment decisions remains 
unresolved. For example, Hinz et al. (2015) conclude that the effects of 
information security incidents on risk premium are poorly understood, 
which creates uncertainty for the methods used to determine a firm’s 
capital costs through risk premium. 
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Information security economists continue to investigate optimal 
investment expenditures and hypothesize on the mechanisms available to 
motivate further expenditure (Gordon et al., 2015). In 2015, Gordon et al. 
built on previous work to extend the Gordon-Loeb Model (Gordon & 
Loeb, 2002) to evaluate the optimal information security investment as a 
function of risk management function. The authors considered the 
monetary loss, vulnerability, and probability to determine the expected 
loss after an investment in security. The extended Gordon-Loeb Model, 
shown in Equation 2, includes the calculation of losses arising from 
externalities like those described by the within-industry spillover effect of 
perceived risk, hypothesized by Etredge and Richardson (2003) and 
confirmed by later research (Kashmiri, Nicol & Hsu, 2017). The extended 
Gordon-Loeb Model presents an inequality, shown in Equation 2, that 
calculates the maximum a risk-neutral firm should invest in information 
security protections, taking into account both internal and external costs, 
where zsc represents the socially optimal level of firm investment in 
information security, v  represents the underlying vulnerability as a 
probability that a breach attempt will be successful without further 
information security investment, LP represents expected private losses 
resulting from an information security incident, LE represents expected 
externality losses, and  = LE/LP represents the ratio between externality 
losses and private losses when an information security incident occurs 
(Gordon et al., 2015).  This equation builds on previous findings that 
establish the economically optimal maximum investment as 36.79% of 
expected loss (Gordon & Loeb, 2002). 
 
zsc(v) < (1/ e)(1+g )vLP » 0.3679(1+g )vLP
 (2) 
The concept of a within-industry spillover effect is an extension of 
previous efforts to document information followership patterns in capital 
markets (Anderson & Holt, 1997), and convergent behavior herding (Zhou 
& Lai, 2009).  This is further confirmed by recent investigation by Lee, 
Hall and Cegielski (2018), who consider the theoretical characteristics 
among companies that may create similarities and probably influence 
contagion effects after an information security event.  
 
According to Hinz et al. (2015), it was unclear how data breach effects on 
capital market participants have changed over time. This was important 
because, in 2011, Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou concluded that information 
security breaches may have a diminishing effect on a firm’s systematic 
risk over time, implying that capital market participants see exposure to 
data breaches as decreasingly important. In 2015, Gordon et al. used 
Gordon, Loeb and Zhou’s 2011 findings to postulate the argument that 
additional government regulation is necessary to create economically 
optimal information security purchasing decisions. This was especially 
relevant given the recent push for research on within-industry spillover 
effects of the breach of an individual company (Kashmiri et al., 2017; 
Martin, Borah, & Palmatier, 2017), and the 2015 argument by Gordon et 
al. that these spillover effects represent social costs that require regulatory 
mitigation. 
 
However, Hinz et al. (2015) reviewed the available evidence and found 
that further research is necessary to better characterize the changing 
impact of a data breach on risk measurements in capital markets.  This 
impacts all companies seeking to finance through public investment 





This study quantitatively describes the changes over time of information 
security incident spillover effects. This study analyzed the variance across 
repeated measurements of event studies, each of which calculated sector-
wide systematic risk using the capital asset pricing model, to inform the 
ongoing debate between extrinsic vs. intrinsic market incentivization, as 
well as the necessity of further information security investment within 
those sectors most prone to data breaches. 
 
Event studies allow the measurement of changes in financial data that can 
be statistically attributable to a specific event. The event study method 
relies on the calculation of the abnormal returns (MacKinlay, 1997), using 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) regression equation, shown in 
Equation 1 and described above.  The inputs to CAPM were publicly 
available at Yahoo! Finance (2017), Google Finance (2017), and several 
other public sites. The data for information security incidents were 
available at PrivacyRights.org (PrivacyRights, 2017).   
Table 1. Summary of Breaches Selected for Sample 
Screening criterion Number of breaches 
available for study 
Total breaches reported (2006-2016) 5325 
Even-year stratification 2059 
Traded on NYSE or NASDAQ 285 
Most frequent sectors (87% of breaches) 228 
Stock data available around breach dates 203 
The 203 investigated breaches were spread across the Healthcare, Finance, 
Technology and Services sectors. 
Table 2. Indexes and Sectors 
Sector Index Ticker 
Financial Vanguard Financials ETF VFH 
Healthcare Vanguard Health Care ETF VHT 
Services VanEck Vectors Retail ETF RTH 
Technology Vanguard Info. Tech. ETF VGT 
Market Model S&P 500 GSPC 
Of all available indices, the Vanguard exchange traded funds (ETFs) are among the 
longest running and most widely known.  Each corresponds directly to the sector 
under investigation, with the exception of the services sector.  Due to Vanguard’s 
within-sector split between consumer stables and consumer discretionary goods, the 
VanEck Vectors Retail ETF was selected as an appropriate balance across the 
industries making up that sector. 
 
The population of firms suffering data breaches was difficult to quantify, 
due to the active concealment employed by perpetrators employ to conceal 
breaches. Among the global population of breaches, several types of data 
compromise existed. These were categorized as fraud involving payment 
card(s), detection of hacking or other malware, intentional insider breach, 
physical loss of paper records, loss of portable device(s), loss of stationary 
device(s), and unintended disclosure (PrivacyRights, 2017). In practice, 
many initial reports did not contain a full understanding of the breach 
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vector so the population also contained a category for unknown causes.  
The number of information security incidents that were not publicly 
disclosed remains a source of speculation beyond the purview of this 
investigation. 
 
Publicly traded firms represented only a fraction of the companies who 
reported breaches during the time span under investigation.  Of the 
available breach records, only every other year of data were considered, 
which allowed for discrete groupings of the continuous event study 
regression outputs. Of the 2,059 breach reports occurring in the even years 
between 2006 and 2016, 285 represented companies traded on the NYSE 
or NASDAQ exchanges. A frequency analysis revealed that 87% of 
publicly traded breaches occurred in four core sectors: Financial, 
Healthcare, Services and Technology.  As shown in Table 1, there were 
enough available data to conduct 203 event studies. Calculation of 
abnormal returns requires an expected market return, as shown and 
described in Equation 1, which necessitates the selection of sector and 
market indexes.  These index and market model selection are depicted in 
Table 2 and represent the best sector-industry fit among available 
alternatives.  The market model used here—the Standard & Poor’s 500 
list—matches the model used in the systematic risk analysis performed by 
Hinz et al. (2015).  The standardization of market models allows for 
comparison between findings, which is important when (as in Hinz et al.’s 
report) there was no significance observed in change to the systematic risk 
for an individual firm.   
 
Fig. 1.   Event studies of sector-wide systematic risk as a measurement of 
spillover effect.  The primary measurement instrument was used repeatedly across 
the time-stratified sample to compare pre- and post-event mean covariance of sector 
and market returns, relative to variance of market returns, over a 241-day event 
window.  An exclusion period of 21 days insulates against short-term share price 
effects, disparate information dispersion, and other market inefficiencies.  
 
The reliability of the event study relies on a rolling beta factor to examine 
covariance of sector and market returns, and variance of market returns, 
during an event window.  As shown in Figure 1, the event window consists 
of a 241-day period (-120, 0, +120).  The main threat to reliability existed 
with the potential conflation of short-term effects resulting from the 
breach announcement on the firm or sector returns. This corresponded to 
a potential for temporary skew in the intercept (), which could have 
confounded the slope calculation () in the regression model. In 
accordance with the recommendation and practice by Hinz et al. (2015), 
this study excluded a period of 21 days (-10, 0, +10) around the breach 
announcement, which partially controls for bias resulting from cumulative 
abnormal returns associated with the breach itself (Hinz et al., 2015; Yayla 
& Hu, 2011).  Further, the exclusion period helps offset potential market 
inefficiencies resulting in uneven information dispersion about the 
information security incident itself.  Finally, specific deviation from the 
CAPM equation for the event study calculations in this study included 
omission of Rf, and , which follows precedents set by Hinz et al. (2015) 
and Schatz and Bashroush (2016), in accordance with the market model 
method recommended by Dyckman, Philbrick and Stephan (1984), that 












Each event study is conducted using Equation 4, where post and pre  each 
represent the mean slope of 110 regressions, where each regression 
examines 120 days of returns as described in Equation 3, when Ri 








To maintain the quality of data, each  was manually screened to only 
consider those records that demonstrated statistically significant 
differences between the pre- and post-breach regression means. All event 
study records that failed to exceed a 95% confidence (p > .05) were 
rejected, leaving 140 breach reports that showed significant differences 
when comparing the sector’s risk profile before and after the breach.   
 
Fig. 2.   Information security incidents of publicly traded companies by year 
and sector.  In this repeated measures ANOVA, each sector is treated as a subject 
and the event studies measuring sector-wide spillover from each breach provides the 
means for within-subjects analysis of variance over time. 
 
The measure of change to sector systematic risk over time () was 
calculated to inform repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
using restricted maximum likelihood (REML) and applied compound 
symmetry for covariance structure determination. The use of REML 
eliminates the effect of nuisance parameters, thereby allowing for 
unbiased estimates of variance and covariance (Harville, 1977; Patterson 
& Thompson, 1971).  The model also employed a fixed intercept that set 
2006 as a baseline control group against which each other year was 
compared.  The repeated measures ANOVA allows for examination of 
the effects of multiple breaches within the same sector over time. The 
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repeated measures ANOVA is most appropriate to test equality of means 
under several different conditions involving repeated measures within the 
same subject (Dien, 2017).  As shown in Figure 2, I treat each sector as an 
individual subject, where each event study is a measurement of that 
sector’s risk-response to an information security incident. 
3 Results 
There was a significant relationship observed between year of a breach 
(IV) and the change in sector systematic risk (DV), representing 
information security incident spillover effect.  The overall model fit is 
significant at p = 0.015, with increasing significance over time, as 
demonstrated in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 3.   
 
As enumerated in Table 4 and depicted in Figure 4, significant results 
existed only for the year of the breach (p = 0.036), not for firm sector (p = 
0.344) or covariance effects between year and sector (p = 0.574). 
Table 3. BY-YEAR spillover effects 
Effects Num df Den df F p 
BY YEAR 5 27 3.491 0.015 
Source  Value Std Error T p 
Intercept 0.000    
2006 0.00%    
2008 -0.04% 0.004 -0.093 0.926 
2010 0.48% 0.003 1.402 0.172 
2012 0.84% 0.004 2.268 0.032 
2014 1.21% 0.004 3.183 0.004 
2016 1.08% 0.004 2.672 0.013 
The analysis of variance between the repeated measures within each sector revealed 
a statistically significant overall effect on beta across all sectors—the sector-wide 
systematic risk calculation used here to measure spillover effects from an 
information security incident.  
  
Table 4. BY-YEAR-BY-SECTOR spillover effects 
Effects Num df Den df F p 
YEAR 5 12 3.470 0.036 
SECTOR 3 104 1.120 0.344 
YEAR*SECTOR 15 12 0.911 0.574 
The covariance displayed in under by-year-by-sector breach effects on the mean 
change in systematic risk, was nearly as likely to occur under the null hypothesis as 
the alternative.  This covariate analysis was revealed by a null model likelihood ratio 





Fig. 3.   Significant changes to sector systematic risk over time reveal an increasing 
information security spillover effect on sector as time increases. 
 
 
Fig. 4.   Spillover effects did not show significant differences between sectors. 
 
 
4 Discussion and Future Research 
The findings presented here suggest that the potential exists for a market-
based incentive to motivate further information security investment. The 
results demonstrate that breach effects can be measured across an entire 
sector and that those sector-wide effects are increasing over time. This 
study represents the first quantitative observation of those effects. These 
data suggest that, after a firm is breached, the entire sector is perceived as 
increasingly risky, which almost certainly raises the risk premium that 
firms within the sector must pay when they seek financing. 
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This study revealed three main areas of further investigation: 1) 
examination of those event studies that did not reveal significant 
differences in pre- and post- breach systematic risk within the sector; 2) 
examination of those companies who were somehow immune to the 
otherwise sector-wide spillover effects; and 3) regulatory regimes best 
equipped to enforce compliance with market-driven standards for 
information security risk management. 
 
The 63 information security incidents that did not demonstrate 
significance in the  calculation, shown in Equation 4, demonstrate 
opportunity for future research.  Specifically, further investigation should 
consider the common factors among those events that suggest potential 
organizational protections for spillover.  Some theoretical considerations 
are proposed by Lee, Hall and Cegielski (2018), who discuss the factors 
that may influence contagion and therefore could suggest company- or 
sector-specific spillover protections.   
 
Similar suggestions might be harvested from individual investigation of 
outliers within those event studies that demonstrated significant sector-
wide spillover.  An analysis of significant common factors among 
outliers—those companies that are somehow shielded from spillover 
effects—would suggest company-specific risk management policies and 
practices that might insulate firms from the breach of a near neighbor. 
 
My findings here, namely that market incentives do exist to motivate 
sector-wide information security investment, present an evidentiary 
challenge to the suggestion that further regulation is necessary to account 
for the extrinsic costs of a breach.  Taking these market incentives into 
consideration, future research could consider regulatory regime options 
that balance mandate and enforcement with sector- or industry-defined 
standards.  For example, Hemphill and Longstreet (2016) described a 
model for meta-regulation that includes a compulsory mandate for 
compliance with industry-defined information security standards. This is 
in line with a body of research into standard setting initiatives within those 
organizations most affected by the standard (eg. Romanosky, Hoffman, & 
Acquisti, 2012; Aggarwal, Dai & Walden, 2011; and Khoo, Harris, & 
Hartman, 2010).  Also, the growing option for risk transfer through cyber 
liability insurance and suggests that firms should consider this mechanism 
for information security risk management.  Finally, Figure 4 demonstrates 
that there were no significant differences in spillover effects across 
sectors, but it is interesting to observe the potential influence of the 
financial sector on the overall analysis, as well as that sector’s changing 
regulatory environment during the 2010-2012 time-span.  While beyond 
the scope of this investigation, a multicollinear analysis of regulatory 
events and information security incidents within the financial industry 
may demonstrate significance in follow-on inquiry. 
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